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Abstract
In this paper, we define specific (general) human capital in terms of the occupations whose use
is spread in a limited (wide) set of industries. We analyze the growth impact of an economy’s
composition of specific and general human capital, in a model where education and R&D are
costly and complementary activities. The model suggests that a declining share of specific
human capital, as observed in the Czech Republic, can be associated with a lower rate of long
run growth. We also discuss optimal educational policies in the presence of market frictions.
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1 Introduction
Education systems across developed countries are highly diverse with respect to their financing
(private vs. public), structure and philosophy (e.g., see OECD, 2010). Because of this, even
though there is little variation in terms of the average level of skills within and between devel-
oped countries (e.g., in terms of average years of schooling, see the Barro-Lee data), there is
important variation in terms of the types of skills developed via education. A number of stud-
ies examine the role of the latter for economic outcomes at the individual or aggregate level.
One stream of literature differentiates skills according to their "vocational intensity," where
a vocation is associated with "practical and technical" skills (e.g., see Krueger and Kumar,
2004a,b; Hanushek et al., 2011). Another stream of literature differentiates skills according to
the "routine intensity" of the tasks performed as part of an occupation, where high routine
intensity is associated with "codifiable" tasks (e.g., see Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and
Dorn, 2013).
We propose an alternative way to horizontally differentiate across skill types in order to
analyze the impact of human capital composition on aggregate economic performance. Similarly
to existing literature, we exploit the cross-occupational differences. Our point of departure
is that our definition derives from cross-industry heterogeneity in the production function:
We differentiate human capital skills according to their "industry specificity." This builds a
sufficiently general conceptual framework to analyze the impact of shocks, aggregate or industry-
specific, skill-biased technology or not.
In particular, we define two distinct types of human capital: "general" and "specific." As
general human capital, we define a set of skills that enable individuals to perform generic tasks
that are required for production in a wide range of industries (e.g., services skills of managers,
manual skills of cleaners). In contrast, specific human capital is defined as a set of skills that
enable one to perform highly specialized tasks in a few industries (e.g., the cognitive skills of
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doctors, manual skills of craft workers).4
Our classification is used to summarize the facts regarding the employment and education
levels of the two human capital types for the Czech economy. This results in a rather uniform
level of skills across the specific and general types of human capital, which agrees with our
horizontal differentiation of skills. We find that in 2007, approximately 36 percent of the total
labor input is comprised of specific human capital. Moreover, the evidence suggests that this
share has been steadily falling since the mid-1990s. We find a similar negative trend in the
share of specific human capital using German and European employment data.
To illustrate how this horizontal differentiation of human capital can matter for long run
growth and welfare, we build up an endogenous growth model, where education and R&D are
costly activities. In the model, both general and specific human capital are used in the final
goods production, while only specific human capital can serve as an input into the educational
sector and R&D. This structure highlights that specific, intensive training on the details of
production is essential for the ability to innovate or train new human capital. We also explicitly
take into account the acclaimed complementarity between basic and/or applied R&D and edu-
cation processes and positive externalities in R&D (e.g., see Griliches, 1992; Nadiri, 1993; Jones
and Williams, 1998).5 In such a context, there is under-investment in R&D at the aggregate
level because economic agents do not fully internalize the benefits of their R&D investments.
The more the economic agents internalize the benefits of their investments, the more they accu-
mulate specific human capital. Because the latter is the engine of growth, the economy enjoys
higher growth.
Our theoretical framework can be used to gain an insight into what can drive the decline in
the share of specific human capital that is observed in the Czech economy. We note that to the
extent a more centralized (education) system is better suited to accounting for any economy-
wide human capital externalities, our model suggests that the Czech Republic would have been
endowed with a high level of specific human capital.6 In turn, the gradual decentralization of the
2
Czech educational system and interest in individual-level wage returns would imply a declining
share of specific human capital, which is consistent with Czech data. In this respect, our model
suggests that in an otherwise frictionless and stable economic environment, this trend could
involve long run welfare costs expressed in terms of the rate of long run growth.
According to our framework, such a pattern can also hold in the case when the formerly
centralized economy involved frictions and over-accumulated specific human capital (e.g., due
to political objectives). Admittedly, such explanations may not be well suited, for example,
for Germany, where we observe similar trends. In this respect, they are by no means the
only potentially plausible explanations for the falling share of specific human capital in this
framework. For instance, this framework also suggests that such a pattern can hold if the
efficiency of the education process of general human capital increases relative to the efficiency
of the education process of specific human capital. This explanation can be reasonable if, for
example, the technical change implied by the introduction of IT has increased the efficiency in
the education process in the field of Computing, relative to other fields. Meanwhile, more than
90% of the graduates in this field have general human capital according to our classification and
data for the Czech Republic. Clearly, the declining share of the specific human capital in the
Czech Republic would not necessarily involve welfare costs if human capital accumulation or an
increase in efficiency of general human capital accumulation were complete explanations.7
The policy implications derived from the model contribute to the debate concerning the role
of public education, R&D, and their finance in light of the recent crisis and subsequent budgetary
cuts. For example, the United States and the United Kingdom were the first countries to move
towards limiting funds for public education, while in the United Kingdom this has been more
the case in individual fields such as humanities. The Czech Republic, among other European
countries, is also considering taking action in a similar direction. Our results highlight that
to the extent the market distortions cannot be excluded, long run welfare can be promoted by
introducing subsidies to the returns on human capital, which would encourage its accumulation.
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Our closed economy model abstracts from international knowledge transfer. Admittedly,
this can be particularly important for technical progress in the Czech Republic, but relatively
less important for the larger economies of Germany and the EU as a whole. In this respect, the
model focuses on secular endogenous changes in the share of specific human capital while being
consistent with the observed trends in the Czech Republic.
Our paper is related to studies which horizontally differentiate among types of skills and
examine the role of such differences for economic outcomes (e.g., Acemoglu and Autor, 2011;
Autor and Dorn, 2013). We contribute to these studies by introducing a new way for horizontally
differentiating among types of skills. With regards to the model, we relate to the endogenous
growth literature that focuses on input accumulation, such as Romer (1990) and Lucas (1988).
Closer to our framework is the model presented in Eicher (1996), where educational investment
is costly, and technology advances as its by-product. Relative to this literature, our main
innovation is that we allow households to choose between the accumulation of general and
specific human capital types and to partially internalize the benefits of their inventions.
Finally, our work relates broadly to studies that examine the intra- and inter-temporal trade-
offs between different types of human capital in environments with uncertainty, the introduction
of new technologies, or trade. Such mechanisms are analyzed in Autor and Dorn (2013), Krueger
and Kumar (2004a,b), Gould et al. (2001), and Hummels et al. (2014) among others. Sarychev
(1999) offers a theoretical model specific to the transition experience from centrally planned
economies to market based ones. Generalizing the economic environment of our model in the
spirit of the aforementioned studies would necessarily benefit the relative value of general human
capital in our framework. Thereby, our baseline results regarding the benefits from increasing
the intensity of specific human capital will not generalize in a straightforward way. Nevertheless,
our present framework is sufficiently parsimonious to highlight the benefits of specific human
capital in the long run and study the impact of the composition of human capital types on
long-term growth and welfare.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the composition of specific and general
human capital in the Czech Republic. Section 3 presents the model and its results. Section 4
concludes.
2 General and Specific Human Capital: The Case of the Czech
Republic
We treat every occupation as defining a particular set of skills that enable the performance of
specific tasks that are necessary as a part of the production process. In this respect, occupations
tightly define the labor services input in the production of each industry. To the extent that
industries differ in their technological needs in terms of the types of labor services, their demand
for occupations would also be different. If input/output markets are frictionless, then the
observed demand for an occupation by different industries can be used to figure out the degree
of an occupation’s "industry specificity." We classify an occupation as "specific human capital"
if it is used by a limited set of industries, i.e., its employment share exhibits a high degree
of concentration across industries. Accordingly, we classify an occupation as "general human
capital" if it is used in the production of a wide variety of products, i.e., its employment share
has a high degree of dispersion.
In order to systematically summarize how specific and general human capital are produced
and used in the Czech economy we employ data from the Czech Labor Force Survey (LFS),
quarter 2, 2007. From this survey we obtain information on the number of workers in labor
force, their education level and field of education (2-digit ISCED-97), occupation (2-digit ISCO-
88) and the industry in which they are employed (1-digit NACE). Using these data we calculate
the number of employed individuals in each occupation-industry cell. Given this matrix, we
calculate the within-occupation employment share across industries, within-industry employment
shares across occupations, and total employment shares by occupation.
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We use the within-occupation employment shares distribution to calculate a number of con-
centration statistics. These statistics are then summarized into an average index that increases
with the concentration of an occupation across industries.8 The correlations across the differ-
ent concentration statistics employed are presented in Table 2. The ranking of the different
occupations in terms of the average index is offered in Table 3. An occupation is classified as
requiring specific human capital if the index is greater than the overall threshold, which is set
to 0.5.9 Table 4 then presents the within-industry employment shares for specific human capital
occupations out of total industry labor input in terms of the absolute number of employees.
Further, using the Czech LFS we identify how the workers’ background in terms of educa-
tional field maps onto occupations in the labor market. We calculate the number of employees
in each occupation-education field (2-digit ISCED-97) cell and the within-education field distri-
bution of employees across different occupations. We summarize this information by computing
the share of employees in specific human capital occupations (as defined in Table 3) for every
education field. Table 5 ranks education fields from the ones where graduates mostly work in
specific human capital occupations (Health and Teacher Training and Educational Science) to
the ones where graduates are mostly employed in general human capital occupations (Law and
Computing).
Finally, we summarize the education levels across all occupations and the two types of human
capital in Table 6 and Table 7. We report the within-occupation shares of those who have basic
education but no higher (ISCED-97 0-2), those who have secondary education but no higher
(ISCED-97 3-4), and those who have higher than secondary education (ISCED-97 5-6).
The results of this exercise are rather intuitive. As an illustration, life science and health pro-
fessionals, such as medical doctors, and teaching professionals, including university professors,
are classified as specific human capital (see Table 3). This is because they are employed almost
exclusively in the health and education sectors. These occupations require a high level of skills
(see Table 6). The training for life science and health professionals comes almost exclusively
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from the health field.10 In contrast, teaching professionals graduate from a wide set of fields
ranging from business and administration to engineering. Another highly skilled group, corpo-
rate managers, is classified as general human capital since they are almost evenly distributed
across all industries. They graduate from a wide set of fields. We also observe seemingly coun-
terintuitive cases of highly skilled groups (lawyers), which are employed by a wide variety of
industries despite being trained (almost) exclusively in the educational field of law and, thus,
classified as general human capital.
Table 7 shows that there is very little difference in the average level of skills between specific
and general human capital occupations. This suggests that our study of horizontal differentia-
tion is indeed capturing the effects differing from those caused by the more commonly studied
vertical split (i.e., low- vs. highly-skilled) of human capital.
The overall employment (use) share of specific human capital is 36.4% for 2007.11 Figure 1
illustrates how the employment share of specific human capital has evolved over the period 1994-
2007 in the Czech Republic. In this figure, we take the information for the period 1994-2002
from Jeong et al. (2008) and interpolate for the Czech Republic for the period 2003-2006.12
There is a clear downward trend with the share falling by 5 percentage points over the course
of the entire period. The downward trend in the employment of specific human capital is not
particular to the Czech Republic since Germany matches it over the course of 1992-2002.13
We further investigate the composition of new graduates (i.e., the potential new entrants
into the labor force) in terms of specific and general human capital. In particular, we examine
the presence of graduates among the most specific human capital intensive education fields,
as identified from the Czech LFS data, using the EUROSTAT educational data for 2007 and
2000. We highlight the education fields where the majority of graduates (more than 50%) end
up in specific human capital related occupations according to our employment data. In 2007,
34.5% of total graduates in the Czech Republic graduated from fields that intensively produce
specific human capital. The corresponding share in 2007 for Germany was 35% and 34% for the
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Euro area. In 2000, the share for the Czech Republic is also close to its German counterpart
(33.1% and 30.6% respectively). We do not have data for sufficiently long period to comment
on the existence of any systematic time patterns. Moreover, there are further limitations in
this respect, as educational data are bound to lag behind labor market developments due to
demographics, difficulties in changing institutions and culture, uncertainty, etc.
Overall, the data presented here show that the Czech Republic has changed its composition
of human capital types in a way that closely matches its neighbors. This outcome may strike
one as surprising as the Czech Republic, among other former transition and Central European
countries, is often presented as a "vocational" economy. For example, in their recent review
Hanushek et al. (2011) show that the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, together with Ger-
many and Switzerland, feature as top apprenticeship countries in Europe, with 72% of the male
population completing "vocational" education and the rest completing "general" education.
Notably though, they define the latter as “tertiary type-A programs [...] largely theory-based
[...] designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry to advanced research programs and
professions with high skill requirements”(p. 9).14 In this respect, their definition is tied more to
the skills level than to the skills type and the degree to which skills are used for the production
of a wide range of products, which is our own primary focus. This highlights the importance of
the original choice of the definition for specific human capital.
3 The Model
The final goods (Y ) producers use physical capital (K), specific human capital (Hs) and general
human capital (Hg), in order to produce homogenous goods.
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived and identical households of
mass one. The representative household owns all types of physical and human capital and
derives utility from the consumption (C) of final goods. The household finances its consumption
expenditures with the labor income and interest earned on capital. The household rents its two
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types of human capital and physical capital at the prevailing market prices (ws, wg, and r,
respectively).
The household can accumulate either type of its human capital through education. Having
intensive training on the details of production, the specific human capital is the necessary input
in the education process. Each human capital has a different accumulation process in the
education sector (i.e., different schooling function).15
Human capital employed in the schooling of specific human capital also engages in R&D. This
process captures the R&D in education/academia-related institutions. Innovation generated
through this process improves the quality (or the efficiency) of the physical capital.
Given that the household owns physical capital and the innovations are embodied in it, the
household (at least partly) internalizes the effect of this R&D process on physical capital. In
the spirit of Romer (1990) and Lucas (1988), the household has decreasing returns from this
process; however, the externalities that stem from others’ involvement in R&D make the returns
constant at the aggregate level. These externalities might arise from knowledge sharing among
researchers and imperfect property rights.16
3.1 Final Goods Sector
The production function of final goods is given by
Y = λYH
γ1
g
[
(usYHs)
γ2 K1−γ2
]1−γ1 , (1)
λY > 0, 1 > γ1 > 0, 1 > γ2 > 0,
where λY is an exogenous productivity level, and u
s
Y is the share of specific human capital
employed in the production of final goods.
Setting the final goods as the numeraire, the optimization problem of a representative pro-
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ducer is given by
max
Hg ,usYHs,K
{Y − wgHg − wsusYHs − rK} , (2)
s.t. (1) .
The resulting optimal rules are the final goods producer’s demands for general and specific types
of human capital and physical capital:
wgHg = γ1Y, (3)
wsu
s
YHs = (1− γ1) γ2Y, (4)
rK = (1− γ1) (1− γ2)Y. (5)
3.2 Education Sector
Specific and general types of human capital have different accumulation processes (schooling
functions), where the only input is the specific human capital. The accumulation processes are
H˙s = λsu
s
sHs, (6)
H˙g = λgu
s
gHs, (7)
respectively, where λs, λg > 0 are exogenous productivity levels, and u
s
s and u
s
g are the shares
of specific human capital employed in the respective accumulation processes.
The human capital employed in the accumulation of specific human capital also produces
new technology Λ according to the following rule:
Λ˙ = δ (ussHs)
γ3 , (8)
where 1 ≥ γ3 ≥ 0, and δ is a productivity level that is exogenous from an individual perspective.
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The technology thus generated improves the quality of physical capital:
K = Λk, (9)
where k is normalized to 1. This R&D process can be thought to represent basic and applied
R&D carried in education/academia-related institutions (e.g., by teaching professionals).
At the aggregate level, there are constant returns in the R&D process, and δ is given by
δ = λΛ (u
s
sHs)
1−γ3 , (10)
where λΛ > 0 is an exogenous productivity level. Therefore, 1 − γ3 equals the degree of
externalities that stem from others’ involvement in R&D. In the limiting case when γ3 = 1,
there are no such externalities, whereas when γ3 = 0, the R&D process is a pure externality.
We also discuss two extensions of this R&D process. In Appendix 5, we treat the allocation
of specific human capital to R&D activity as a (separate) choice variable, which makes the
comparative statics easy to derive. In Appendix 6, we include small exponents of physical
capital and general human capital in the R&D and education processes. Our main results carry
over in both these extensions.
3.3 The Households
The representative household has a standard CIES utility function with an inter-temporal sub-
stitution parameter 1θ > 0. It discounts the future streams of utility with rate ρ > 0. The
lifetime utility of the household is given by
U =
+∞∫
0
C1−θt − 1
1− θ exp (−ρt) dt. (11)
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The household’s decisions follow its preferences and satisfy its budget constraint:
0 = rK + wsu
s
Y (1 + τ
s
Y )Hs + wg
(
1 + τ gY
)
Hg − C − T, (12)
1 ≥ τ sY ≥ −1, 1 ≥ τ gY ≥ −1,
where the triple
{
τ sY , τ
g
Y , T
}
represents government policy, consisting of proportional taxes (or
subsidies) on earnings from specific and general human capital employed in the production of
final goods, and a lump-sum tax T. The tax T, which is needed to balance the government
budget, in equilibrium is given by
T = wsu
s
Y τ
s
YHs + wgτ
g
YHg. (13)
The sum of shares of specific capital in the education and final goods sectors satisfies
1 ≥ usY + uss + usg. (14)
The inter-temporal choice of the household is between allocating specific human capital to the
final goods sector and allocating it to the education sector for factor accumulation. Patient
households "save" more by investing into specific human capital Hs. The household’s optimal
problem is
max
usY ,u
s
g ,C

+∞∫
0
C1−θt − 1
1− θ exp (−ρt) dt

s.t.
(12) , (6) , (7) , (8) , (9) , (14) ,
Hs (0) , Hg (0) ,Λ (0) > 0− given.
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Assigning shadow values {qi} to constraints (12), (6), (7), and (8), the decision rules that follow
from the household’s optimization are
C−θ = q1, (15)
q1ws (1 + τ
s
Y )Hs = q2
H˙s
uss
+ q4γ3
Λ˙
uss
, (16)
q3
H˙g
usg
= q2
H˙s
uss
+ q4γ3
Λ˙
uss
, (17)
q˙2 = q2ρ−
[
q1wsu
s
Y (1 + τ
s
Y ) + q2
H˙s
Hs
+ q3
H˙g
Hs
+ q4γ3
Λ˙
Hs
]
, (18)
q˙3 = q3ρ− q1wg
(
1 + τ gY
)
, (19)
q˙4 = q4ρ− q1rk. (20)
The first optimal decision is for the consumption path. The next two describe the allocations
of specific human capital in the final goods and education sectors, where the second term on the
right-hand side of both expressions is the value stemming from R&D activity.17 The remaining
decision rules describe the returns on the accumulation of the two types of human capital and
technology/capital.18 The household’s optimal choices also satisfy transversality conditions:
lim
t→+∞ q2Hs exp (−ρt) = 0,
lim
t→+∞ q3Hg exp (−ρt) = 0,
lim
t→+∞ q4K exp (−ρt) = 0.
Using the letter g for the growth rates of variables and combining expressions (3), (4), (5),
(16), and (17), the returns on accumulation of all types of asset holdings of the household can
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be rewritten as
− gq2 = λs + λΛγ3
q4
q2
− ρ, (21)
− gq3 = λg
1 + τ gY
1 + τ sY
γ1
(1− γ1) γ2
Hs
Hg
usY − ρ, (22)
− gq4 =
1− γ2
γ2
1
1 + τ sY
Hs
Λ
usY
(
λs
q2
q4
+ γ3λΛ
)
− ρ. (23)
The ratio q4q2 shows the value from relaxing the constraint for Λ˙, (8), compared to the
value from relaxing the constraint for H˙s, (6). According to (21) and (23), the return on the
accumulation of specific human capital, −gq2 , increases with that ratio, whereas the return on
the accumulation of technology, −gq4 , declines with it.
4 Features of the Dynamic Equilibrium
The main results regarding the behavior of the economy are the following.
Proposition 1. The balanced growth path growth rates and allocations of the economy can be
derived from the root(s) of the following quadratic polynomial in q4q2 .
P
(
q4
q2
)
=
[
θ +
1 + τ gY
1 + τ sY
γ1
(1− γ1) γ2 +
1− γ2
γ2
1
1 + τ sY
γ3
]
1
θ
λΛγ3
(
q4
q2
)2
(24)
+
{[
1 +
1
θ
1 + τ gY
1 + τ sY
γ1
(1− γ1) γ2
]
(λs − ρ) + ρ
+
λs (2− θ)− ρ
θ
1− γ2
γ2
γ3
1
1 + τ sY
}
q4
q2
− 1− γ2
γ2
1
1 + τ sY
λs
λΛ
[
λs − 1
θ
(λs − ρ)
]
.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Since the quadratic coefficient is positive, a sufficient condition for two real roots is a negative
free term. It is sufficient to have
θ ≥ 1 (25)
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in order for the free term to be negative. This condition implies that the household needs to
have a relatively low elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. It is a common condition that
ensures balanced growth in multi-sector growth models. In our framework, it implies also that
there is only one positive root. Hereafter, it is assumed that (25) holds.
Proposition 2. In the decentralized equilibrium on the balanced growth path, all quantities grow
at the same rate
g =
1
θ
(
λs + λΛγ3
q4
q2
− ρ
)
, (26)
where q4q2 is the positive root of the polynomial P
(
q4
q2
)
. Moreover, all relative prices are constant,
and the growth rates of shadow values q1, q2, q3, and q4 are equal.
Proof. See Appendix 1, which also offers the system of equations that can be solved for the
relative allocations.
Therefore, the condition that ensures a positive growth rate of consumption on the balanced
growth path is
λs + λΛγ3
q4
q2
> ρ. (27)
Together with (25) this condition is necessary in order for the transversality conditions to hold
and for the lifetime utility to be bounded. Hereafter, it is assumed that (27) holds for any value
of γ3, which is equivalent to assuming that λs > ρ.
Proposition 3. A sufficient condition for saddle path stability is
(1− γ2) γ1
γ2
1 + τ gY
1 + τ sY
− (1− γ1) γ2 − γ1 < 1
θ − 1 . (28)
Proof. See Appendix 2.
If the economy starts not at the balanced growth path level, under this condition it experiences
smooth and monotonic transition to balanced path. Hereafter, it is assumed that (28) holds.19
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In order to further highlight the properties of the decentralized equilibrium, Table 1 offers
the (main) comparative statics for balanced growth path quantities (ratios) and rates of growth.
Some of the derivatives in this table are obtained using numerical methods since the analytical
derivations become cumbersome due to high non-linearity of equations (for further details see
Appendix 1). The non-linearity arises because the return on the accumulation of specific human
capital, −gq2 , is linear in q4q2 , while the return on accumulation of technology, −gq4 , is linear in
the inverse of q4q2 , but on the balanced growth path the returns need to be equal. When R&D
is a pure externality (i.e., γ3 = 0), −gq2 does not depend on q4q2 , and the comparative statics are
easily computed (see Appendix 4).20
Focusing on the most interesting comparative statics, according to Table 1, the share of
specific human capital allocated to the training of specific human capital, uss, increases with
γ3. This happens since higher γ3 implies a higher internalized benefit from R&D and, thus, a
larger incentive for accumulating specific human capital. This is also the reason for the ratio of
specific and general human capitals, HsHg , as well as the share of specific human capital,
Hs
Hg+Hs
,
increase with γ3. Meanwhile, the growth rate, g, increases with γ3 since the driver of growth in
this economy is the accumulation of specific human capital.
These results carry over to the case when we include small exponents of physical capital
and general human capital in the R&D and education processes (see Appendix 6). Intuitively,
this holds because increasing γ3 increases the return on specific human capital accumulation
more than the return on general human capital accumulation when the share of specific human
capital in the R&D and education processes is larger than the combined share of general human
capital and physical capital. Moreover, higher returns on human capital accumulation increases
the incentives to save and the growth of final output.21
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4.1 Possible Explanations for the Falling Share of Specific Human Capital
in the Czech Republic
In this framework, the share of specific human capital will gradually decline if its initial value
is higher than the balanced growth path value. We further present some seemingly plausible
explanations for such a relation as observed in the Czech Republic.
An unanticipated decline in γ3 matches this relationship. The intuition behind this is that
more centralized mechanisms are, arguably, better at accounting for possible economy-wide ex-
ternalities. The decentralization process in the Czech Republic, therefore, would have increased
the effective degree of externalities, 1− γ3. According to Table 1 such an unanticipated decline
would also imply a decline in the rate of long run growth. Evidently, such a change in γ3 could
also stem from, for example, the spread of information and communication technologies which
can ease the access to intellectual property and might dilute the strength of intellectual property
rights.
This is by no means the only plausible explanation according to Table 1. Another seem-
ingly reasonable explanation for the decline in the share of specific human capital can be an
unanticipated increase in the efficiency of the education process of general human capital, λg.
Such an explanation is plausible to the extent that the introduction and use of information and
communication technologies could have increased the productivity of the education process in
the Computing field relative to other fields, as our data suggest that almost all graduates in
this field have general human capital. The share of specific human capital would be higher
than its balanced growth path value also if the centralized economy involved frictions and over-
accumulated specific human capital. Clearly, if any of these two were exhaustive explanations,
the declining share would not necessarily involve any welfare costs.
According to Table 1, changes in policy parameters τ sY and τ
g
Y can also be responsible for the
changes in the share of specific human capital as observed in Czech economy. In our framework,
these policy parameters can be thought to represent education policy since they affect the value
17
and incentives of accumulating human capital relative to earning wage returns. For example,
higher τ sY implies lower incentives to accumulate human capital and in that sense corresponds
to lower education subsidies. According to Table 1, higher τ sY implies a higher share of specific
human capital. In turn, if τ sY and τ
g
Y increase simultaneously then the share of specific human
capital declines. Public expenditures on education (% of GDP) in the Czech Republic were
quite volatile in the period of 1994 - 2007 and have declined by around 10% according to WDI
data. If this corresponds to a higher τ sY but constant τ
g
Y then, according to the model, it cannot
match the observed change in the share of specific human capital. However, if it corresponds
to a simultaneous increase in τ sY and τ
g
Y , then it can be another plausible explanation. Data
limitations do not allow us to check whether τ sY and τ
g
Y have changed simultaneously, although
that seems quite reasonable. It corresponds to a horizontal decline in subsidies to education of
specific and general types of human capital.
We perform a very simplistic calibration exercise in order to check whether required changes
in γ3, λg, and τY ≡ τ sY = τ gY for matching the observed trend are reasonable. In this exercise, the
values of utility parameters and the share of capital compensation are obtained from Hlousˇek
(2012). The values of these parameters are ρ = 0.05, θ = 1, and (1− γ1) (1− γ2) = 0.3,
correspondingly. We use data from labor force survey for income deciles in order to calibrate
the share of general human capital compensation, γ1. More precisely, we use the value of average
income decile of persons with general human capital in the Czech Republic in 2009 (such data
are available from 2009). We obtain that the share of general human capital compensation out
of total human capital compensation is 0.55. This, together with the share of (physical) capital
compensation, implies that γ1 = 0.39 and γ2 = 0.51. To pin down the value of γ3 and τY , we
assume that externalities were relatively weak in 1994 so that γ3 = 0.9 and normalize τY = 0.
Assigning λs = 0.1 allows us to keep the long-term growth rate in the model economy below
double digits and to maintain regularity conditions. Further, we assume that the Czech economy
was on a balanced growth path in 1994, which admittedly is a bold assumption, and derive the
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value of λg from the observed share of specific human capital, 41.5%. The value obtained for λg
is 0.67, which is significantly larger than the value of λs. In terms of the model economy, this
corresponds to a more difficult training process for specific human capital relative to general
human capital.
Similarly, we assume that the Czech economy was on a balanced growth path in 2007. In
2007 the share of specific human capital was 36.4%. We attempt to match this with a change
in either γ3 or λg or τY . Our numerical exercise implies that either γ3 needs to decline to 0.51
or λg needs to increase to 0.84 or τY has to increase to 0.76. Although the required change of
τY is relatively large, the required changes of γ3 and λg seem to be not extraordinarily high and
fall into a reasonable ballpark.22
4.2 Policy Inference
When γ3 = 1 and the tax rates are zero, the decentralized equilibrium solution coincides with
the social planner’s solution. However, when γ3 < 1 in the decentralized equilibrium the benefits
from allocating specific human capital to the education sector that stems from the increased
rate of innovation cannot be fully appropriated by the household. This distortion arises because
of the decreasing returns in education at the individual level. As a result, for any uss, specific
human capital earns higher returns in social optimum than in the decentralized equilibrium.
Thus, at least on the balanced growth path, the socially optimal growth rate and the share of
specific human capital are all higher than their counterparts in the decentralized economy.
Taxing earnings from both types of human capital uniformly can increase the growth rate
of the decentralized economy to its socially optimal level since it can increase human capital
allocation to eduction and R&D. The following proposition elaborates this statement.
Proposition 4. The policy in the decentralized equilibrium that delivers the same allocations
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and growth rates as in the social planner’s solution is
1 + τ sY = γ3, (29)
1 + τ gY = 1 + τ
s
Y . (30)
Under this policy,
q4γ3 = q
SP
4 ,
where SP stands for the social planner’s solution.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
This result is intuitive. The tax rate τ sY corrects the distortion in the value of allocating
specific human capital to its accumulation that stems from an increase in the innovation rate. It
equates the shadow value of specific human capital in the decentralized equilibrium adjusted for
the externality, q4γ3, to its shadow value in the social optimum, q
SP
4 . Meanwhile, the equality
τ gY = τ
s
Y keeps the optimal rule (22) in accordance with the socially optimal rule, where there
are no tax rates. The reason why τ gY and τ
s
Y need to be equal is that there are no frictions on the
production side; therefore, the ratio of wages is not distorted. Such a horizontally homogenous
education policy retains the optimal ratio. However, it reduces the value of the specific human
capital less than the value of the general human capital since the former also conducts R&D.
Given the nature of the externalities, such a disproportionate change is essential for attaining
socially optimal outcomes.23
4.3 Discussion of the Model
As noted in the introduction, for the sake of highlighting the role of specific human capital as
the engine of growth in the most parsimonious way, we built a model that does not capture
the inherent flexibility of general human capital. This implies that our findings regarding the
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benefits from accumulating specific human capital might be biased upwards.24 However, our
present framework still captures how the choice of the type of human capital is tied to a choice
between current and future consumption levels: The higher the utility cost of sacrificing present
consumption is, the more likely the economy would be relatively abundant in general human
capital.
In this respect, we view the present model as the first step towards building a generalized
theoretical framework that would capture more aspects of the economic environment. Impor-
tantly, this would involve, first, building a multi-sector production structure and second, adding
sources of aggregate uncertainty. The former allows us to model explicitly the defining feature
of general human capital, i.e., its usability across a variety of production sectors. The latter
allows us to analyze explicitly the advantage of general human capital over specific one, namely
its ability to adjust to new economic conditions. Such a framework would necessarily compli-
cate the inter-temporal trade-off between the two types of human capital to a significant degree,
making growth and welfare implications non-straightforward. Our conjecture is that for highly
stable economic environments, the results would be qualitatively similar to those of our present
model. This extension is left for future research.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider industry-specificity as a distinct source of human capital heterogeneity
that is defined irrespective of the skill-level accumulated through education. Accordingly, we
define general and specific human capital. We apply our definitions to study the composition
of the production structure and education in the Czech Republic in terms of the two types of
human capital and find a declining employment (use) share of specific human capital in the
Czech economy.
Moreover, we develop a stylized model that captures trade-offs between the two types of
human capital and the importance of specific human capital as the source of long run growth.
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Through the lens of the model, we may interpret the declining share of specific human capital
as an aspect of transition from the previous centralized system of education and production to
a market-based mechanism.
In an environment with frictions in R&D, we discuss optimal educational policies. Our model
suggests that providing public funds for R&D and education could be optimal in the presence of
the R&D externality, which corresponds to a common policy implication in endogenous growth
models with externalities. More empirical work is needed to establish the position of the Czech
and European economies with respect to an optimal specific human capital share.
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Comparative Statics
q4/q2 q3/q2 Hs/Hg Hs/Λ g u
s
s u
s
g u
s
Y u
s
s/u
s
g
ρ [0.001, 0.09] + + − 0 − − ± + −
θ [1, 10] + + − 0 − − ± + −
γ1 [0.01, 0.99] − − − 0 − − + − −
γ2 [0.01, 0.99] − − ± 0 − − ± + ±
γ3 [0.01, 0.99] ± + + 0 + + ± − +
λs [0.1, 10] ± + + + + + ± − +
λg 0 − − 0 0 0 0 0 0
λs, λs ≡ λg [0.1, 10] ± − + + + + ± − +
λΛ − 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0
τ sY [−0.99, 0.99] − − + 0 − − − + +
τ sY , τ
g
Y ≡ τ sY [−0.99, 0.99] − − − 0 − − ± + −
Note: The sign + means a positive relationship, − negative, 0 no relationship, and ± means that the relationship depends
on model parameters. Some of these comparative statics are derived with a numerical exercise (see for details Appendix 1).
The intervals for parameter values used in the exercise are offered in the table. In this exercise, we form a multidimensional
grid of parameter values using 5 equidistant points from each interval. We perform the exercise for those points from that
multidimensional grid that satisfy parameter restrictions (27) and (28).
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Table 2: Correlation Among Concentration Statistics
CI CV HI EI EXI
CI
CV 0.955
HI 0.936 0.991
EI -0.869 -0.830 -0.823
EXI 0.861 0.831 0.850 -0.926
GI 0.919 0.979 0.950 -0.831 0.787
Note: This table offers pair-wise correlations among concentration measures computed for within-occupation employ-
ment shares distribution. The concentration measures are average concentration index (CI), coefficient of variation (CV),
Herfindahl index (HI), entropy index (EI), exponential index (EXI), and Gini index (GI). In order to construct CI, we
define dummy variables for each of the concentration measures which are equal to 1 for higher than median values of the
concentration measures, 0 otherwise. The average concentration index (CI) is the average of these dummy variables.
Table 3: Assignment of Occupations into Specific and General Human Capital Types
Specific = 1; Average CI
Occupation General = 0
Legislators and Senior Officials 1 1
Life Science and Health Professionals 1 1
Teaching Professionals 1 1
Life Science and Health Associate Professionals 1 0.6
Teaching Associate Professionals 1 1
Models, Salespersons and Demonstrators 1 1
Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers 1 1
Subsistence Agricultural and Fishery Workers 1 1
Extraction and Building Trades Workers 1 0.6
Precision, Handicraft, Craft Printing and Related Trades Workers 1 1
Other Craft and Related Trades Workers 1 1
Stationary Plant and Related Operators 1 1
Machine Operators and Assemblers 1 1
Agricultural, Fishery and Related Laborers 1 1
Laborers in Mining, Construction, Manufacturing and Transport 1 0.8
Corporate Managers 0 0
Managers of Small Enterprises 0 0
Physical, Mathematical and Engineering Science Professionals 0 0.2
Other Professionals 0 0
Physical and Engineering Associate Professionals 0 0
Other Associate Professionals 0 0
Office Clerks 0 0
Customer Services Clerks 0 0.2
Personal and Protective Services Workers 0 0
Metal, Machinery and Related Trades Workers 0 0.2
Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators 0 0
Sales and Services Elementary Occupations 0 0
Note: This table classifies occupations (2-digit ISCO-88) into specific and general types of human capital according to the
value of the average concentration index (CI). An occupation is classified into specific human capital if the value of CI is
greater than 0.5 and into general human capital otherwise.
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Table 4: The Share of Specific Human Capital in Industries
The Share of Specific
Industry name NACE code Human Capital, %
Fishing B 76.0
Education M 66.7
Agriculture, Hunting and Related Service Activities A 60.8
Construction F 58.1
Health and Social Work N 57.0
Manufacturing D 45.0
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles G 42.7
Motorcycles and Personal and Household Goods
Mining and Quarrying C 40.4
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply E 23.8
Public Administration and Defence; L 14.5
Compulsory Social Security
Extra-territorial Organizations and Bodies Q 12.3
Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities O 11.4
Private Households with Employed Persons P 7.7
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities K 5.9
Transport, Storage and Communication I 3.8
Hotels and Restaurants H 3.4
Financial Intermediation J 0.6
Note: For each industry this table offers the share of employment in specific human capital occupations out of total industry
labor input in terms of the (absolute) number of employees. Industries are ranked from the highest to the lowest intensity
in specific human capital.
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Table 5: The Share of Specific Human Capital in Education Fields
The Share of Specific
Education Field Human Capital, %
Health 79.8
Teacher Training and Educational Science 75.1
Life Science 64.0
Manufacturing and Processing 59.9
Architecture and Building 53.2
Veterinary 47.1
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 43.4
Environmental Protection 36.9
Humanities 36.6
Arts 36.1
General Programs 35.4
Business and Administration 32.9
Personal Skills 32.6
Mathematics and Statistics 31.6
Physical Science 27.3
Security Services 26.8
Engineering and Engineering Trades 23.9
Personal Services 23.5
Social Services 16.8
Transport Services 12.0
Social and Behavioral Science 9.8
Journalism and Information 9.3
Computing 7.5
Law 7.3
Note: For each education field, this table offers the share of employed individuals who have specific human capital.
Education fields are ranked from the highest to the lowest share. The Literacy and Numeracy field is missing from the
table because we have virtually no observations for that field in the sample.
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Table 6: Distribution of Skill Levels Across Occupations,%
Low-skilled Medium-skilled Highly Skilled
Occupation Name ISCED [0 - 2] ISCED [3 - 4] ISCED [5 - 6]
Agricultural, Fishery and Related Laborers 31.2 66.7 2.1
Sales and Services Elementary Occupations 29.7 69.8 0.5
Laborers in Mining, Construction, 25.9 73.6 0.5
Manufacturing and Transport
Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers 16.4 79.6 4
Machine Operators and Assemblers 12.2 87.4 0.5
Stationary Plant and Related Operators 12 87.2 0.8
Other Craft and Related Trades Workers 8.8 90.6 0.6
Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators 8.3 91.1 0.5
Models, Salespersons and Demonstrators 7.7 90.8 1.5
Personal and Protective Services Workers 7.2 90.3 2.5
Military Personnel 6.3 73.4 20.3
Office Clerks 4.7 90.6 4.7
Customer Services Clerks 4.6 92.6 2.9
Extraction and Building Trades Workers 4.4 94.9 0.7
Precision, Handicraft, Craft Printing and 3.7 94 2.3
Related Trades Workers
Metal, Machinery and Related Trades Workers 3.7 95.6 0.7
Managers of Small Enterprises 2.2 67.5 30.3
Physical and Engineering Science 1.3 82.4 16.3
Associate Professionals
Other Associate Professionals 1.1 80.7 18.2
Corporate Managers 1 58.1 40.8
Life Science and Health Associate Professionals 0.2 87.8 12
Other Professionals 0.2 44.1 55.7
Physical, Mathematical and Engineering 0.1 29.6 70.3
Science Professionals 0.1 29.6 70.3
Legislators and Senior Officials 0 45.7 54.3
Life Science and Health Professionals 0 7.6 92.4
Teaching Professionals 0 18.3 81.7
Teaching Associate Professionals 0 79.2 20.8
Subsistence Agricultural and Fishery Workers 0 100 0
Note: For each occupation, this table offers the share of employed individuals in each level of highest attained educa-
tion/skills out of total number of individuals in each occupation. There are three levels of highest attained education:
pre-primary to lower-secondary (low-skilled; ISCED-97 0-2), secondary to post-secondary non-tertiary (medium-skilled;
ISCED-97 3-4), and tertiary (highly skilled; ISCED-97 5-6). Occupations are listed from the highest to the lowest share
of employed individuals who have pre-primary to lower-secondary education (low-skilled; ISCED-97 0-2). The share of
employed individuals in each education level can be used as a ranking of occupations according to skill levels. Such a
ranking matches surprisingly well with the ranking of the OECD (2010), which we offer in Table (8).
Table 7: Distribution of Skill Levels Across Human Capital Types, %
Low-skilled Medium-skilled Highly Skilled
Human Capital Type ISCED-97 [0 - 2] ISCED-97 [3 - 4] ISCED-97 [5 - 6]
Specific 8.1 78.2 13.7
General 4.8 79.6 15.6
Note: This table offers the share of employed individuals with low-, medium-, and high-level education who have specific
human capital occupation out of total employment in specific human capital occupations and the share of employed indi-
viduals with low-, medium-, and high-level education who have general human capital occupation out of total employment
in general human capital occupations. These levels of education are pre-primary to lower-secondary (low-skilled; ISCED-97
0-2), secondary to post-secondary non-tertiary (medium-skilled; ISCED-97 3-4), and tertiary (highly-skilled; ISCED-97
5-6).
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Table 8: Classification of Occupations into Wider Groups and Skill Levels
Occupation Wide Group Skill Level
Legislators and Senior Officials 1 Highly Skilled and
Corporate Managers White Collar
Managers of Small Enterprises
Physical, Mathematical and Engineering 2
Life Science and Health Professionals
Teaching Professionals
Other Professionals
Physical and Engineering Associate Professionals 3
Life Science and Health Associate Professionals
Teaching Associate Professionals
Other Associate Professionals
Office Clerks 4 Low-skilled and
Customer Services Clerks White Collar
Personal and Protective Services Workers 5
Models, Salespersons and Demonstrators
Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers 6 Highly Skilled and
Subsistence Agricultural and Fishery Workers Blue Collar
Extraction and Building Trades Workers 7
Metal, Machinery and Related Trades Workers
Precision, Handicraft, Craft Printing and
Related Trades Workers
Other Craft and Related Trades Workers
Stationary Plant and Related Operators 8 Low-skilled and
Machine Operators and Assemblers Blue Collar
Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators
Sales and Services Elementary Occupations 9
Agricultural, Fishery and Related Laborers
Laborers in Mining, Construction,
Manufacturing and Transport
Note: This table offers ISCO-88 classification of occupations into wider occupational groups and the OECD (2010) classi-
fication of these occupations into skill levels and types.
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Figure 1: The Employment Share of Specific Human Capital
Note: This figure offers the employment share of specific human capital in the Czech Republic (solid line) for the period
1994-2007 and for Germany (dashed line) for the period 1992-2002.
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4. Our definitions of specific and general skills are remotely similar with Becker’s definitions
in Becker (1962).
5. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Moretti (2003) identify significant and positive human
capital externalities. The presence of such externalities implies that in a decentralized
equilibrium, returns on human capital are lower than is socially optimal. In our case,
it also implies that there is less R&D than is socially optimal which is in line with, for
example, Jones and Williams (1998).
6. The returns from sharing experience/knowledge might be easier to appropriate in a more
centralized environment since it can be easy to track the use of shared knowledge in such
an environment.
7. The observed trend can also be the net output of a number of different factors apart from
those that we highlight in our stylized model, such as structural change or regulatory
barriers.
8. More precisely, we compute the coefficient of variation, Herfindahl index, entropy index,
exponential index, and Gini index. For each of these concentration measures we create a
dummy variable equal to 1 for those values of the concentration measure under consider-
ation that are higher than its median. Our average index is the average of these dummy
variables.
9. Using alternative thresholds, like the median or the 30th percentile does not change our
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empirical results materially, even though employing looser definition for classifying oc-
cupations as specific human capital naturally increases the total employment rate of the
group.
10. The relationship between education and the training of health care professionals could be
overstated since they are typically obligated by law to have training in medicine.
11. This excludes military personnel, ISCO-88 0.
12. For the period 1994-2002, the calculation of the specific human capital employment share
excludes ISCO-88 62 as the relevant data are not reported in the original source.
13. The downward trend is further confirmed by the European average employment share data
by occupation that we obtain from Goos et al. (2010). The average employment share
of specific human capital in Europe was 36.3% in 1993 and decreased to 31.3% by 2006.
This evidence excludes ISCO-88 11, 6, 33, 23, 92, as these occupations are not reported.
Excluding the same ISCO-88 codes in our data, we find that the Czech Republic moved
from an employment share of 34.6% in 1994 to 31.8% in 2007.
14. See footnote 7 in Hanushek et al. (2011).
15. Human capital accumulation processes in our model can constitute any type of training.
16. We abstract from any issues of obsolescence and any further labor market frictions in
order to highlight the impact of friction in R&D on human capital allocations.
17. The second term in the right-hand side of expressions (16) and (17) is zero when γ3 = 0
because R&D is a pure externality for the household in this case.
18. The pair
(
τ sY , τ
g
Y
)
is referred to as education policy in this model given that it affects the
household’s trade-off between training and working.
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19. This condition holds, for example, for logarithmic instantaneous utility function and/or
for sufficiently small γ1 and sufficiently large γ2.
20. Similarly, −gq2 does not depend on the ratio q4q2 when the allocation of specific human
capital to R&D activity is a (separate) choice variable. In this case the comparative
statics can be easily computed (see Appendix 5).
21. These comparative statics also hold when there are several types of specific human capital,
some of which do not contribute to R&D. In this respect, which of these two types of human
capital contributes more to R&D and generates externalities is an interesting empirical
question.
22. Clearly, this exercise can underestimate, for example, the required change in γ3 since in
our data there are types of specific human capital which neither engage in training nor in
R&D.
23. The policy τ sY = τ
g
Y > 0 represents a subsidy to education to the extent that it increases
the return on education relative to the wage rate and motivates schooling.
24. In the current framework, having in mind academia-related R&D we have assumed that
specific human capital which trains specific human capital engages in R&D. Our findings
regarding the benefits from accumulating specific human capital could be biased upwards
if general human capital also engages in R&D.
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Technical Appendices
Appendix 1
From the accumulation processes of the two types of human capital (6) and (7), technology (8)
and the expression for physical capital (9) and δ (10), it follows that on a balanced growth path
the growth rates of Hs, Hg, K and Λ are equal:
gHs = gHg = gK = gΛ ≡ g.
In turn, from the production function of final goods (1), optimal rules of the representative final
goods producer (3), (4), and (5), the budget constraint of the household (12), and the balanced
government budget condition (13), it follows that on a balanced growth path the following holds
gY = gC = gT = g, (31)
gws = gwg = gr = 0.
Given that all quantities grow at the same rate from (16)-(20), it follows that
gq1 = gq2 = gq3 = gq4 ≡ gq. (32)
This expression states that on a balanced growth path the returns on the accumulation of all
types of asset holdings are equal.
From (31), (32), and (21) in turn, it follows that
g =
1
θ
(
λs + λΛγ3
q4
q2
− ρ
)
.
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The System of Equations that Solves for the Growth Rates and (Relative) Alloca-
tions on Balanced Growth Path
From the production function of final goods (1) and the optimal rules of final goods producers
(4), (3), and (5), it follows that
Y
Hg
= λY
[(
usY
Hs
Hg
)γ2 ( K
Hg
)1−γ2]1−γ1
, (33)
wg = γ1
Y
Hg
, (34)
ws = (1− γ1) γ2 1
usY
Y
Hs
, (35)
Y
rΛ
=
1
(1− γ1) (1− γ2) . (36)
From the accumulation processes of human capitals (6), (7), and ideas (8) and from the expres-
sion for physical capital (9), it follows that
g = λsu
s
s = λgu
s
g
Hs
Hg
= λΛu
s
s
Hs
Λ
, (37)
K
Λ
= 1. (38)
From the budget constraint (12) and the equation for shares of specific human capital (14),
it follows that
C
Hs
=
Y
Hs
, (39)
1 = usY + u
s
s + u
s
g. (40)
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Finally, from (15) and (32) together with (31), it follows that
g = −1
θ
gq, (41)
and
−gq = λs + λΛγ3 q4
q2
− ρ (42)
= λg
1 + τ gY
1 + τ sY
γ1
(1− γ1) γ2
Hs
Hg
usY − ρ (43)
=
1− γ2
γ2
1
1 + τ sY
Hs
Λ
usY
(
λs
q2
q4
+ γ3λΛ
)
− ρ.
The system of equations (33)-(43) can be solved for balanced growth path (relative) allocations
and growth rates.
By elimination this system can be reduced to:
usg =
Γ1g
(
1− 1λs g
)
(θ + Γ1) g + ρ
, (44)
θg = λs + λΛγ3
q4
q2
− ρ, (45)
(θ + Γ1) g = Γ2
(
λs
q2
q4
+ γ3λΛ
)(
1− 1
λs
g
)
− ρ, (46)
where
Γ1 =
1 + τ gY
1 + τ sY
γ1
(1− γ1) γ2 , (47)
Γ2 =
1− γ2
γ2
1
1 + τ sY
λs
λΛ
. (48)
From the last two equations of the remaining system g can be eliminated and the resulting
equation can be written as
a
(
q4
q2
)2
+ b
(
q4
q2
)
+ c = 0, (49)
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where
a =
(
θ + Γ1 + γ3
λΛ
λs
Γ2
)
1
θ
λΛγ3,
b =
θ + Γ1
θ
(λs − ρ) + ρ+ λs (2− θ)− ρ
θ
γ3
λΛ
λs
Γ2,
c = −Γ2
[
λs − 1
θ
(λs − ρ)
]
.
Since (49) is a quadratic equation in q4q2 , there are two solutions. If a > 0 and c < 0, the
solutions are real numbers that have different signs. It can be shown that a sufficient condition
for this is θ ≥ 1.
A similar quadratic equation can be derived for HsHg using (37) and (44)-(46),
a˜
(
Hs
Hg
)2
+ b˜
(
Hs
Hg
)
+ c˜ = 0, (50)
where
a˜ =
[
θ − 1
λs
(λs − ρ)
]
λgΓ1,
b˜ = −
[
λsθ + (θλs + ρ) γ3
λΛ
λs
Γ2 + Γ1 (λs − ρ)
]
,
c˜ = − 1
λg
λsργ3
λΛ
λs
Γ2.
Similar to the case for q4q2 , a sufficient condition for having one real and positive root is θ ≥ 1.
Comparative Statics
From (49), it is straightforward to notice that q4q2 increases with ρ, does not depend on λg, and is
inversely proportional to λΛ. Moreover, from (49) it can be shown that the sign of the derivative
of q4q2 with respect to γ1 is equivalent to the sign of the following expression:
37
[
−
(
1− b√
b2 − 4ac
)
∂
∂γ1
b− 2c√
b2 − 4ac
∂
∂γ1
a
]
a−
[
−b+
√
b2 − 4ac
] ∂
∂γ1
a.
Since a > 0, ∂∂γ1 b > 0, and
∂
∂γ1
a > 0, it can be easily shown that this expression is negative.
Therefore, q4q2 declines with γ1.
Given that q4q2 does not depend on λg and is inversely proportional to λΛ, it follows from
(37) and (44)-(46) that HsHg declines with λg and does not depend on λΛ. In turn, the signs
of the derivatives of HsHg with respect to γ1 and θ are equivalent to the signs of the following
expressions.
− a˜ ∂
∂θ
b˜+ b˜
∂
∂θ
a˜+
2a˜c˜√
b˜2 − 4a˜c˜− b˜
∂
∂θ
a˜,
− a˜ ∂
∂γ1
b˜+ b˜
∂
∂γ1
a˜+
2a˜c˜√
b˜2 − 4a˜c˜− b˜
∂
∂γ1
a˜.
These expressions are negative since c˜ < 0, a˜ ∂∂θ b˜ > b˜
∂
∂θ a˜, and a˜
∂
∂γ1
b˜ > b˜ ∂∂γ1 a˜. Therefore,
Hs
Hg
declines with γ1 and θ.
Meanwhile, since
∂
∂γ3
b˜ < 0,
∂
∂γ3
c˜ < 0,
∂
∂γ3
a˜ = 0,
∂
∂λs
b˜ < 0,
∂
∂λs
(a˜c˜) < 0,
∂
∂λs
a˜ < 0,
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from (50) it follows that HsHg increases with γ3 and λs.
When τ gY ≡ τ sY , it can be shown that the following holds
∂
∂τ sY
b˜,
∂
∂τ sY
c˜ < 0;
∂
∂τ sY
a˜ = 0.
It follows then from (50) that in this case HsHg declines with τ
s
Y . According to (37), the ratio of
specific human capital to physical human capital HsΛ depends only on λs and λΛ. It increases
with λs and declines with λΛ.
Table 9 summarizes the signs of comparative statics that follow from these results together
with (37) and (44)-(46). Deriving the signs of the remaining comparative statics requires tedious
algebra. Numerical methods are used in order to obtain them. These additional results, together
with the intervals of parameter values used in the numerical exercises, are presented in Table 1.
Appendix 2
Denote
ω1 =
Hg
Hs
,
ω2 =
Λ
Hs
.
In the case of an interior solution for the shares of specific human capital [i.e., uss, u
s
g, u
s
Y ∈ (0, 1)],
it can be shown that the dynamic system of equations of the model reduces to two differential
equations from usY and ω2. These equations are
 gusY
gω2
 = 1detA(usY , ω2)
 A22b1 −A12b2
A11b2 −A21b1
 , (51)
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where
detA(usY , ω2) = A11A22 −A12A21,
A11 =
λΛ − λsω2
ω2
1
λg
λg
λs
Γ1u
s
Y
1 + γ3
λΛ
λs
λΛ
λs
Γ2
1
ω2
usY
1
1 + γ3
λΛ
λs
λΛ
λs
Γ2
1
ω2
usY
,
A12 = 1 +
Γ1u
s
Y
1 + γ3
λΛ
λs
λΛ
λs
Γ2
1
ω2
usY
+ γ3
λΛ
λs
λΛ
λs
Γ2
1
ω2
usYA11,
A21 =
λΛ − λsω2
ω2
[
1 + (θ − 1) (1− γ1) γ2 + (θ − 1) γ1 1
1 + γ3
λΛ
λs
λΛ
λs
Γ2
1
ω2
usY
]
,
A22 = θ
λΛ
ω2
−A21,
b1 =
λΛ − λsω2
ω2
(1− usY ) ,
b2 =
λΛ − λsω2
ω2
[
λs
(
1 + γ3
λΛ
λs
λΛ
λs
Γ2
1
ω2
usY
)
− ρ
]
.
Therefore, the Jacobian of the system is a two-by-two matrix, and its elements are
J (1, 1) =
1
detA(usY , ω2)
∂
∂usY
(A22b1 −A12b2)
−
[
1
detA(usY , ω2)
]2
(A22b1 −A12b2) ∂
∂usY
detA(usY , ω2),
J (1, 2) =
1
detA(usY , ω2)
∂
∂ω2
(A22b1 −A12b2)
−
[
1
detA(usY , ω2)
]2
(A22b1 −A12b2) ∂
∂ω2
detA(usY , ω2),
J (2, 1) =
1
detA(usY , ω2)
∂
∂usY
(A11b2 −A21b1)
−
[
1
detA(usY , ω2)
]2
(A11b2 −A21b1) ∂
∂usY
detA(usY , ω2),
and
J (2, 2) =
1
detA(usY , ω2)
∂
∂ω2
(A11b2 −A21b1)
−
[
1
detA(usY , ω2)
]2
(A11b2 −A21b1) ∂
∂ω2
detA(usY , ω2).
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It is straightforward to notice that detA(usY , ω2) is proportional to
λΛ−λsω2
ω2
. In turn,
(A11b2 −A21b1) is proportional to the square of λΛ−λsω2ω2 . At the steady-state (balanced growth
path), where
usY = 1−
Γ1
(
1− gλs
)
(θ + Γ1) g + ρ
g − 1
λs
g,
ω2 =
λΛ
λs
, 0
0
 = 1detA
 A22b1 −A12b2
A11b2 −A21b1
 ,
this implies that
∂
∂usY
gω2 = 0.
Therefore, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the steady-state are J (1, 1) and J (2, 2).
After some tedious algebra, it can be shown that at the steady-state
J (2, 2) < 0,
and J (1, 1) is positive if the determinant of matrix A is negative. The determinant of matrix
A is negative if
{
(θ − 1) (1− γ1) (1− γ2)− γ3λΛ
λs
Γ2 [1 + (θ − 1) (1− γ1) γ2]usY
}
Γ1u
s
Y
−
(
1 + γ3
λΛ
λs
Γ2u
s
Y
){
[1 + (θ − 1) (1− γ1) γ2]
(
1 + γ3
λΛ
λs
Γ2u
s
Y
)
+ (θ − 1) γ1
}
< 0,
where usY is given by (37) and (40).
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Since usY ∈ (0, 1) a sufficient condition for saddle path stability is
[
(1− γ2) γ1
γ2
1 + τ gY
1 + τ sY
− (1− γ1) γ2 − γ1
]
<
1
θ − 1 .
When tax rates τ sY and τ
g
Y are equated, this condition can be rewritten as
(1− γ2)2 γ1
γ2
− γ2 < 1
θ − 1 ,
and holds, for example, for γ2 > 0.5 or for θ = 1.
If the initial value of the ratio of human capital types, ω2, is not at its steady-state, the
model exhibits transition dynamics along the stable manifold. At time 0, the value of usY jumps
to the stable-manifold level, after which a monotonic convergence of usY , ω2, as well as ω1 to
their steady-state values is observed. Figure 2 presents the stable manifold in (usY , ω2) space
for the following parameter values:
ρ = 0.05, θ = 1, γ1 = 0.39, γ2 = 0.51, γ3 = 0.9, (52)
λs = 0.1, λg = 0.67, λΛ = 0.1, τ
s
Y = τ
g
Y .
It might happen that the initial value of general human capital is such that either uss or u
s
g
hits zero bound.1
For example, suppose that uss > 0 and u
s
g = 0. In this case,
λgq3 < λsq2 + γ3λΛq4. (53)
Since the wage of general human capital, wg, increases relative to the wage of specific human
capital, ws, and the return on physical capital, r, as Hs and K grow, at some point in time wg
1Given that (1) satisfies Inada conditions, it has to be that usY > 0.
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will become so large that usg will become positive. This is equivalent to a declining q2 and q4
and a constant q3 in (53) and can hold if the economy is relatively abundant in general human
capital. Such a situation holds, for example, when ω1 ≥ 1, θ = 5, and the remaining parameters
are given by (52).
Similarly, when uss = 0 and u
s
g > 0 then the following holds
λgq3 > λsq2 + γ3λΛq4. (54)
In this case, since ws and r increase relative to wg as Hg grows at some point in time, u
s
s will
become positive. This is equivalent to a declining q3 and a constant q2 and q4 in (54) and can
hold if the economy is relatively abundant in specific human capital. Such a situation holds, for
example, when ω1 ≤ 0.2 and for parameter values (52).
Appendix 3
It can be shown that in the social optimum, the quadratic equation (49) is given by
(
θ + Γ˜1
θ
+ Γ˜2
λΛ
λs
1
θ
)
λΛ
(
q4
q2
)2
+ (55)
+
[
θ + Γ˜1
θ
(λs − ρ) + ρ+ λs (1− θ) + λs − ρ
λsθ
Γ˜2λΛ
]
q4
q2
−
− Γ˜2
[
λs − 1
θ
(λs − ρ)
]
= 0,
where Γ˜1 and Γ˜2 are given by (47) and (48) with the tax rates τ
s
Y and τ
g
Y set to zero. This
implies that when the tax rates in the decentralized equilibrium are set so that
1 + τ sY = γ3, (56)
1 + τ gY = 1 + τ
s
Y , (57)
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(thus making Γ˜1 = Γ1 and Γ˜2 = γ3Γ2), the positive root of (55) coincides with γ3 times the
positive root of (49). In other words,
γ3
q4
q2
=
(
q4
q2
)SP
, (58)
where SP denotes the social planner’s solution.
Moreover, it can be easily shown that the system of equations which solves for the balanced
growth path allocations and growth rates of social optimum is essentially the same as (33)-(43),
except that γ3 is equal to 1 in (43). Therefore, it can be shown that the policy (56) and (57)
delivers socially optimal allocations and growth rates in the decentralized equilibrium on the
balanced growth path. According to (51), it also does so on the transition path.
Appendix 4
In this section, we offer the decentralized equilibrium results when γ3 = 0.
The problem and optimal decision rules of the final goods producer and the human capital
accumulation processes remain the same. Therefore, the expressions (1)-(7) are still valid. When
γ3 = 0, the accumulation of technology is a pure externality for the household. Therefore, the
household’s problem is
max
usY ,u
s
g ,C

+∞∫
0
C1−θt − 1
1− θ exp (−ρt) dt

s.t.
(12) , (6) , (7) , (14) ,
Hs (0) , Hg (0) ,K (0) > 0− given.
Assigning shadow values {qi} to constraints (12), (6), (7), the decision rules that follow from
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the household’s optimization are
C−θ = q1,
q1ws (1 + τ
s
Y )Hs = q2
H˙s
uss
, (59)
q3
H˙g
usg
= q2
H˙s
uss
, (60)
q1r > 0⇒ supply all K,
q˙2 = q2ρ−
[
q1wsu
s
Y (1 + τ
s
Y ) + q2
H˙s
Hs
+ q3
H˙g
Hs
]
, (61)
q˙3 = q3ρ− q1wg
(
1 + τ gY
)
. (62)
From (6), (7), (59), (60), (61), and (62), it follows that
q3
q2
=
λs
λg
,
− gq2 = λs − ρ,
− gq3 = λg
wg
(
1 + τ gY
)
ws
(
1 + τ sY
) − ρ.
This implies that when both types of human capital are accumulated, the ratio of wages should
be fixed
wg
(
1 + τ gY
)
ws
(
1 + τ sY
) = λs
λg
.
The economy is on a balanced growth path in such a case. The growth rate of the economy
(quantities) on a balanced growth path is
g =
1
θ
(λs − ρ) .
The growth rate above is less than the socially optimal one, given by the equation (26) with
γ3 set to one. Therefore, the share of the specific human capital allocated to its accumulation
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is lower than its socially optimal value, because uss is proportional to the growth rate of Hs and
all the quantities are growing at the same rate.
The comparative statics for this model can be derived analytically and are presented in
Table 10. For example, usg increases with ρ and θ when θ = 1 and λs > 2ρ and declines with
these parameters when θ >> 1. Meanwhile, usg increases with λs when θ >> 1 and λs < 2ρ and
declines when λs > 2ρ.
Appendix 5
In this section, we offer the decentralized equilibrium results when R&D intensity is a choice
variable.
Similarly to Appendix 4, the problem and optimal decision rules of the final goods producer
and the human capital accumulation processes remain the same. Therefore, the expressions (1)-
(7) are still valid. However, the R&D equation and the equation for shares of specific human
capital change. The household’s problem in such a case is
max
usY ,u
s
g ,C

+∞∫
0
C1−θt − 1
1− θ exp (−ρt) dt

s.t.
(12) , (6) , (7) ,
Λ˙ = δ (usΛHs)
γ3 , (63)
uss + u
s
Y + u
s
g + u
s
Λ ≤ 1,
Hs (0) , Hg (0) ,Λ (0) > 0− given.
Assigning shadow value {qi} to constraints (12), (6), (7), and (63), the decision rules that follow
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from the household’s optimization are
C−θ = q1,
q1ws (1 + τ
s
Y )Hs = q2
H˙s
uss
,
q3
H˙g
usg
= q2
H˙s
uss
,
q4γ3
Λ˙
usΛ
= q2
H˙s
uss
,
q˙2 = q2ρ−
[
q1wsu
s
Y (1 + τ
s
Y ) + q2
H˙s
Hs
+ q3
H˙g
Hs
+ q4γ3
Λ˙
Hs
]
,
q˙3 = q3ρ− q1wg
(
1 + τ gY
)
,
q˙4 = q4ρ− q1rk.
These optimal rules imply that
q3
q2
=
λs
λg
,
q4
q2
=
λs
γ3λΛ
,
− gq2 = λs − ρ,
and
− gq3 = λg
wg
(
1 + τ gY
)
ws
(
1 + τ sY
) − ρ,
− gq4 = γ3λΛ
rk
ws
(
1 + τ sY
) − ρ.
Therefore, on a balanced growth path the growth rate of the economy and the share of specific
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human capital allocation to its accumulation are
g =
1
θ
(λs − ρ) ,
uss =
g
λs
.
The comparative statics for this model can be derived analytically and are presented in
Table 11. When θ >> 1, ∂∂λsu
s
g and
∂
∂λs
usΛ are both positive; these derivatives become negative
when θ = 1 and γ2 ≈ 0 or γ1 ≈ 1. When θ >> 1, ∂∂ρusg and ∂∂ρusΛ are negative but turn positive
for γ2 ≈ 0 or γ1 ≈ 1. Finally, ∂∂θusg and ∂∂θusΛ are negative when θ >> 1, but these derivatives
change sign for γ2 ≈ 0 or γ1 ≈ 1.
Appendix 6
In this section, we analyze the decentralized equilibrium of a version of the model where we
include physical capital and general human capital in the education and R&D processes. To
guarantee the existence of the balanced growth path, we assume that education and R&D
processes are given by
H˙s = λs (u
g
sHg)
γs1
[
(ussHs)
γs2
(
uKs K
)1−γs2]1−γs1 ,
H˙g = λg
(
uggHg
)γg1 [(usgHs)γg2 (uKg K)1−γg2 ]1−γg1 ,
Λ˙ = δ
[
(ugsHg)
γΛ1 (ussHs)
1−γΛ1
]γ3
,
where γs1, γ
g
1 , 1 − γs2, 1 − γg2 ∈ [0, 1) are the exponents of general human capital and physical
capital in the education processes. γΛ1 ∈ [0, 1) is the exponent of general human capital in the
R&D process. δ measures external effects. We assume that, in equilibrium, δ is given by
δ = λΛ
[
(ugsHg)
γΛ1 (ussHs)
1−γΛ1
]1−γ3
.
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Moreover, we assume that now the production function of final goods is given by
Y = λY
(
ugYHg
)γ1 [(usYHs)γ2 (uKY K)1−γ2]1−γ1 ,
where we use letter u to denote shares,
usY + u
s
s + u
s
g = 1,
ugY + u
g
s + u
g
g = 1,
uKY + u
K
s + u
K
g = 1.
The remainder of the model remains the same.
It can be shown that the first order conditions from the firm’s problem are given by
wgu
g
YHg = γ1Y,
wsu
s
YHs = (1− γ1) γ2Y,
ruKY K = (1− γ1) (1− γ2)Y.
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The first order conditions from the household’s problem are given by
C−θ = q1,
q1ws (1 + τ
s
Y )Hs = q2 (1− γs1) γs2
H˙s
uss
+ q4γ3
(
1− γΛ1
) Λ˙
uss
,
q3 (1− γg1) γs2
H˙g
usg
= q2 (1− γs1) γs2
H˙s
uss
+ q4γ3
(
1− γΛ1
) Λ˙
uss
,
q1wg
(
1 + τ gY
)
Hg = q2γ
s
1
H˙s
ugs
+ q4γ3γ
Λ
1
Λ˙
ugs
,
q3γ
g
1
H˙g
ugg
= q2γ
s
1
H˙s
ugs
+ q4γ3γ
Λ
1
Λ˙
ugs
,
q1rK = q2 (1− γs1) (1− γs2)
H˙s
uKs
,
q3 (1− γg1) (1− γg2)
H˙g
uKg
= q2 (1− γs1) (1− γs2)
H˙s
uKs
.
In turn, the envelope theorem conditions from the household’s problem are given by
q˙2 = q2ρ−
[
q1wsu
s
Y (1 + τ
s
Y ) + q2 (1− γs1) γs2
H˙s
Hs
+ q3 (1− γg1) γg2
H˙g
Hs
+ q4γ3
(
1− γΛ1
) Λ˙
Hs
]
,
q˙3 = q3ρ−
[
q1wgu
g
Y
(
1 + τ gY
)
+ q2γ
s
1
H˙s
Hg
+ q3γ
g
1
H˙g
Hg
+ q4γ3γ
Λ
1
Λ˙
Hg
]
,
q˙4 = q4ρ−
[
q1ru
K
Y k + q2 (1− γs1) (1− γs2)
H˙s
K
+ q3 (1− γg1) (1− γg2)
H˙g
K
]
.
Denoting ugg,γ =
1
γg1
ugg and x =
q4
q2
Λ
Hs
, the system of equations which characterizes equilibrium
allocations on the balanced growth path can be written as
uss =
[
(1− γs1) γs2 + γ3
(
1− γΛ1
)
x
]
ugg,γ ,
ugs = (1− γg1) γs2
γs1 + γ3γ
Λ
1 x
(1− γs1) γs2 + γ3
(
1− γΛ1
)
x
ugg,γ
usg
uss,
g =
1
θ
(
1
ugg,γ
g − ρ
)
,
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and
g = λs
(
ugs
Hg
Hs
)γs1 {
(uss)
γs2
[
(1− γs1) (1− γs2)
1
x
Λ
Hs
ugg,γk
]1−γs2}1−γs1
,
g = λg
(
γg1u
g
g,γ
)γg1
×
{(
usg
)γg2 [(1− γg1) (1− γg2) (γs1 + γ3γΛ1 x) 1x ΛHs u
g
g,γ
ugs
kugg,γ
]1−γg2 Hs
Hg
}1−γg1
,
Λ
Hs
=
1
g
λΛ
(
ugs
Hg
Hs
)γΛ1
(uss)
1−γΛ1 ,
1
ugg,γ
x =
(1− γ2)(
1 + τ sY
)
γ2
[
(1− γs1) γs2 + γ3
(
1− γΛ1
)
x
] 1− uss − usg
uss
+ (1− γs1) (1− γs2) + (1− γg1) (1− γg2)
(
γs1 + γ3γ
Λ
1 x
) ugg,γ
ugs
1− uss − usg
uss
=
(1− γ1) (1 + τ sY ) γ2(
1 + τ gY
)
γ1
γs1 + γ3γ
Λ
1 x
(1− γs1) γs2 + γ3
(
1− γΛ1
)
x
1− ugs − γg1ugg,γ
ugs
.
The remainder of the variables can be solved from the following equations
q3
q2
=
Hs
Hg
(
γs1 + γ3γ
Λ
1 x
) ugg,γ
ugs
,
uKs =
1
x
(1− γs1) (1− γs2)ugg,γ ,
uKg =
(1− γg1) (1− γg2)
(1− γs1) (1− γs2)
(
γs1 + γ3γ
Λ
1 x
) ugg,γ
ugs
uKs ,
uKY = 1− uKs − uKg ,
usY = 1− uss − usg,
ugY = 1− ugs − γg1ugg,γ ,
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and
Y
Hs
=
λY
(
ugYHg
)γ1 [(usYHs)γ2 (uKY Λk)1−γ2]1−γ1
Hs
,
q1
q2
=
(1− γs1) (1− γs2)
(1− γ1) (1− γ2)g
uKY
uKs
Hs
Y
,
x =
q4
q2
Λ
Hs
,
ugg = γ
g
1u
g
g,γ .
We perform comparative statics for the share of specific human capital, HsHg+Hs , the share of
specific human capital allocated to its accumulation, uss, and the growth rate of final output, g,
with respect to γ3. We use numerical methods to perform these comparative statics, where we
set
λs = λΛ = 0.1, λg = 0.67,
θ = 1, ρ = 0.05,
γs1 = γ
g
1 , γ
s
2 = γ
g
2 ,
and allow all parameters γ to vary in between [0.1, 0.9]. In this exercise, we form a multidimen-
sional grid of parameter values using 5 equidistant points from each interval.
We find that g increases with γ3. We also find that
Hs
Hg+Hs
and uss increase with γ3 when γ
Λ
1 ∈
[0, 0.2], γs1 ∈ [0.1, 0.4], and γs2 ∈ [0.6, 0.9]. This combination of values of γs1 and γs2 corresponds
to the case when the shares of general human capital and physical capital in education are
lower than the share of specific human capital. However, there are
{
γΛ1 , γ
s
1, γ
s
2
}
points from
{[0.2, 0.9] , [0.4, 0.9] , [0.1, 0.6]} where HsHg+Hs declines with γ3.
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Appendix - Tables and Figures
Table 9: Analytical Comparative Statics
q4/q2 q3/q2 Hs/Hg Hs/Λ g u
s
s u
s
g u
s
Y u
s
s/u
s
g
ρ + + 0
θ − 0 − − −
γ1 − − − 0 − −
γ2 0
γ3 + 0 + + +
λs + +
λg 0 − − 0 0 0 0 0 0
λs, λs ≡ λg +
λΛ − 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0
τ sY 0
τ sY , τ
g
Y ≡ τ sY − − − 0 − − −
Note: The sign + means a positive relationship, − negative, and 0 means no relationship.
Table 10: Comparative Statics - γ3 = 0
q3/q2 Hs/Hg Hs/Λ g u
s
s u
s
g u
s
Y u
s
s/u
s
g
ρ 0 − 0 − − ± + −
θ 0 − 0 − − ± + −
γ1 0 − 0 0 0 + − −
γ2 0 + 0 0 0 − + +
λs + + + + + ± − +
λg − − 0 0 0 0 0 0
λs, λs ≡ λg 0 + + + + ± − +
λΛ 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0
τ sY 0 + 0 0 0 − + +
τ sY , τ
g
Y ≡ τ sY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: The sign + means a positive relationship, − negative, 0 no relationship, and ± means that the relationship depends
on model parameters.
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Table 11: Comparative Statics - R&D Intensity is a Choice Variable
q4/q2 q3/q2 Hs/Hg Hs/Λ g u
s
s u
s
g u
s
Y u
s
Λ u
s
s/u
s
g
ρ 0 0 − − − − ± + ± −
θ 0 0 − − − − ± + ± −
γ1 0 0 − + 0 0 + − − −
γ2 0 0 + + 0 0 − + − +
γ3 − 0 + − 0 0 − − + −
λs + + + + + + ± − ± +
λg 0 − − 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
λs, λs ≡ λg + 0 + + + + ± − ± +
λΛ − 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0 0
τ sY 0 0 + + 0 0 − + − +
τ sY , τ
g
Y ≡ τ sY 0 0 − + 0 0 + + − −
Note: The sign + means a positive relationship, − negative, 0 no relationship, and ± means that the relationship depends
on model parameters.
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Figure 2: Stable Manifold in (usY , ω2) Space
Note: This figure offers simulated stable manifold in
(
usY , ω2
)
space.
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